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ABSTRACT 
A scientific reasoning system makes decisions using objective vidence in the 
form of independent experimental trials, propositional xioms, and constraints on 
the probabilities of events. I propose a collection of algorithms that derive 
probability intervals and estimate conditional probabilities from objective vidence 
in those forms. This reasoning system can manage uncertainty about data and 
rules in a rule-based expert system. I expect hat the system will be particularly 
applicable to diagnosis and analysis in domains with a wealth of experimental 
evidence such as medicine. The algorithms currently apply to systems with arbi- 
trary amounts of experimental evidence but with less than 20 variables. 1 discuss 
limitations of this solution and propose future directions for this research. This 
work can be considered a generalization of Nilsson's "'probabilistic logic" to 
intervals and experimental observations. 
KEYWORDS: interval probability, evidence combination, experimental 
evidence, probabilistic logic, statistical inference 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Expert systems were originally defined as a method of encoding the knowl- 
edge and reasoning of a human expert into a computer program. However, for 
many diagnostic and analytical reasoning problems we would prefer that the 
computer program base its reasoning on objective facts rather than human 
expertise, especially when no experts are available or the reasoning of the 
available experts is suspect. Thus, I propose a system for reasoning from 
objective criteria--experiments performed by the method of identical 
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independent trials. Since identical independent trials are a standard method of 
gathering scientific data and there is a vast store of literature containing the 
results of this type of experiments, I feel that a system that reasons accurately 
from such data will be of great utility. 
When objective data are collected by scientists and engineers they are often 
in the form of independently distributed trials or experiments. An example of 
experimental data is, In a sample of 100 toys, 10 arrived damaged. Some of 
these experiments verify facts, as in this example; other experiments verify 
rules such as 10% of 20 red toys arrived damaged; this experiment establishes 
a relationship between redness and damage. Several rules can conflict, such as 
90% of 10 toy trucks arrived damaged, which raises the question of the red toy 
truck. 
The system presented here does not attempt to simulate the reasoning of an 
expert or a scientist. Rather, it is a normative system that attempts to generate, 
or at least bound, the objectively correct values for the requested probabilities. 
This paper describes a computationally feasible algorithm for making deci- 
sions from this type of evidence in small or simple domains (domains that 
can be represented using less than 20 variables). I present a preliminary 
methodology for evidence combination, where the source of the evidence is 
experimental in nature. 
I assume throughout the paper that the frequencies provided to the system 
were collected using correct scientific methodology and thus they represent 
insofar as possible independent and independently distributed scientific trials. 
Representing and reasoning from scientific data collected using a flawed 
methodology would require a far more complex theory, which should be the 
subject of future work. 
The scheme presented here can also account for other methods of expressing 
objective information such as axiomatic statements uch as Trucks have 
wheels, and restrictions on the probabilities of events, such as The probability 
of heads on a fair coin is 0.5, the probability of heads when Joe is flipping the 
coin is somewhere between 0.6 and 0.8. 
The strength of this system is its ability to accept evidence in a large variety 
of formats that can express many different forms of uncertainty. Initially I will 
focus on our management of experimental evidence, since that is the unique 
feature of our approach. 
2. PREVIOUS WORK 
This work was inspired largely by Henry Kyburg and Ron Loui's work 
[1-4] at the University of Rochester on the logical foundations of statistical 
inference. Their work uses experimental results to derive sets of confidence 
intervals and then develops an algebra of these sets of confidence intervals. 
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Kyburg [1] discussed the use of second-order probability distributions for 
subjective vidence valuations. Such an approach requires subjective val- 
uations of an exponential number of probabilities. He did not investigate 
objective higher order probabilities, but he did suggest objective interval 
probabilities as most appropriate for objective uncertainty management. 
Another important influence on this work is the Dempster-Shafer system 
[5, 6] for managing uncertainty and the analyses of it [7-9]. Dempster-Shafer 
reasoning expresses belief as mass functions over sets of possible beliefs and 
develops a calculus of such mass functions for evidence combination. Although 
such mass functions may be a good way of summarizing human expertise, I 
felt that they were not suitable for expressing the uncertainty inherent in 
objective evidence. Hau and Kashyap [10] suggested a method of applying 
Dempster-Shafer and fuzzy reasoning to rule-based expert systems that con- 
sider one of the best approaches to this problem if the rules and facts in the 
system are derived from a subjective or qualitative source. 
This work owes a great deal to the Bayesian interval approach to uncer- 
tainty; it reduces to Good's Bayesian interval approach [11, 12] when only 
interval probabilities are supplied. Our work also is meant o handle the same 
class of applications as Judea Pearl's probability networks [13] and other 
Bayesian network paradigms [14-24]. Of particular note on this topic is 
Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter's work [22] on efficient calculation of probabilities 
from Bayesian belief networks. Dr. Cheeseman otes [25] that difficulties are 
presented by the number of probabilities that must be entered into such a 
system. He is skeptical that all of these numbers can be accurately estimated. 
As our system uses observations rather than probabilities as its input, we avoid 
these inaccuracies. 
Herskovits and Cooper [23] study the extraction of a belief network from a 
large database of clinical cases. However, this paper assumes that the database 
already contains accurate conditional probabilities for event and thus suffers 
from the difficulties noted by Cheeseman. The presence of accurate conditional 
probabilities does not seem to be necessary to this approach, and perhaps the 
same approach can be applied to accurately estimating a network from observa- 
tions or trials. 
Our work generalizes Nilsson's "probabilistic logic" [26], where he also 
studies mapping joint distributions into a vector space. His work analyzes the 
case where all the information items are point probabilities for events; our 
work reduces to his when our information is in this form. 
Our work applies to the same domain as that discussed by Birnbaum [27, 
28]. His work, like ours, focuses on likelihoods, as he discusses independent, 
identically distributed binary experiments, but his work does not consider 
computational concerns or multiple types of experiments. Our work is different 
from this and other statistical approaches in that most statistical work studies 
how to construct an experiment to accurately determine the probability of an 
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event, whereas our work focuses on what can be deduced from experimental 
evidence a posteriori. This work is important because not every decision maker 
has the opportunity to construct experiments relevant o his or her decision; a 
doctor makes decisions based on published experimental research and the 
symptoms at hand, but he does not perform new controlled studies for each 
patient. 
Berger has discussed extensively the sufficiency of the likelihood function 
for characterizing evidence in a monograph with Wolpert [29] and more 
concisely in his textbook [30]. He presents and justifies as a basis for statistical 
inference the likelihood principle--" All the information about 0 obtainable 
from an experiment is contained in the likelihood function for the actual 
observation." However, when discussing implementations of the likelihood 
principle he strongly supports a Bayesian approach. The lack of a truly 
noninformative prior over joint distributions I and computational concerns has 
led us to a maximum likelihood approach. 
Kyburg [3] and Loui [4] have surveyed and discussed a large variety of 
methods for uncertain inference including most of the systems that are 
comparable to ours. 
3. DEFINIT IONS 
The input to our system consists of a set of propositions and a set 
of experiments hat test logical combinations of these propositions. For exam- 
ple, consider playing poker against Harry. What can we deduce from Harry's 
body language about his hand? Consider these two propositions: 
A: Harry lit his pipe, 
B: Harry has two pairs. 
Some experiments about the relationship between these two events are 
1. In the first 30 hands Harry lit his pipe in 9 of them. 
2. In the next 40 hands Harry had two pairs in 5 of them. 
3. In the following hands you noticed that of the 6 times he lit his pipe 5 of 
those times he had two pairs. 
The joint distribution of events in our domain contain all the information 
about the domain that is useful for deduction. The joint distribution is the 
probability distribution over the elements of the truth table; that is, in our 
i Using the uniform prior distribution results in marginal second-order prior distributions that are 
strongly biased towards probability 1/2. I am unaware of a well-defined prior that has unbiased 
second-order marginal distributions. 
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poker example, 
• a: A and B 
• b: A and Not B 
• c :Not  A and B 
• d:  Not A and Not B 
If we knew the probability of a, b, c, and d, we could determine the 
probability of any logical combination of events and all the conditional 
probabilities too. Hence, to engage in deduction from experimental evidence, 
we will study the issue of estimating a joint distribution from experimental 
evidence. 
4.  MAXIMUM L IKEL IHOOD EST IMAT ION 
In this work I propose estimating the probability of a proposition 
as one of the probabilities derived from a joint distribution that maximizes the 
probability of the experimental results. 
I.n estimation theory, if we are estimating the value of e, the function that 
maps values of e into probabilities of the observed ata is called the likeli- 
hood function. The value of e that maximizes the likelihood function is 
called the maximum likelihood estimate. The maximum likelihood joint 
distribution is the joint distribution that maximizes the probability of the 
experimental results. 
We assume that each experiment is identically independently distributed (iid) 
and that the sampling was unbiased. The probability of observing a logical 
combination of the primitives (such as "A  or B")  is a sum of probabilities in 
the joint distribution; in our poker example the probability of A is a + b and 
that of B is a + c. Thus the probability of an experiment consisting of iid 
trials on A where A was observed 3 out of 5 times is then (a + b)3(c -4- d) 2. 
The iid assumption implies that the probability of a set of experiments i  the 
product of the probabilities from each experiment. Hence, the likelihood 
function for statements 1 and 2 of our poker example is 
(a q- b)9(c -1- d)21(a -t- c)5(b q- d) 35 
Conditional experiments, where the result is reported only when a condition 
applies, that is statement 3, have a conditional probability. The probability 
of a conditional experiment is the ratio of the probability of the conjunction 
of the condition and the event and the probability of the condition. Thus the 
probability of statement 3 is 
aSb/(a + b) 6 
The probability of statements 1, 2, and 3 is 
a5b(a + b)3(c + d)2'(a + c ) ' (b  + d) 35 
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Since we had an experiment on A where A occurred 9 times, we could 
perform up to nine conditional experiments on A and still express the 
likelihood function as a polynomial (rather than a rational function). This 
paper's analysis is restricted to sets of experiments whose likelihood function is 
a polynomial; this means that given N experiments using condition X, an 
experiment was done where condition X occurred at least N times. Whether a 
set of experiments fits this condition can be determined in time L log L, where 
L is the size of the likelihood function. 
5. OBSERVATION SPACE 
Each joint distribution is an assignment of probabilities to a finite set of 
mutually exclusive vents; hence a joint distribution can be considered a vector 
(JDV), and the locus of joint distributions in a set of points in a vector space. 
In our poker example there are four mutually exclusive vents, a, b, c, and d; 
assignments of probabilities to these events correspond to four-dimensional 
vectors. For example, if A and B are independent events with probabilities 
0.3125 and 0.1429, respectively, then the corresponding JDV would be 
(a = 0.0446, b = 0.2679, c = 0.0982, d = 0.5893). 
The probability of an observation is a linear function of the JDV; in our 
poker example, A has a probability of a + b. These linear functions define a 
dual space of observation vectors (OVs) with the same dimensionality, whose 
coefficients are 1 if the corresponding element of the joint distribution is 
compatible with the observation and 0 otherwise. In our poker example, A 
is represented by the OV (1, l, 0, 0), and B is (1, 0, 1,0), and A but not B is 
the OV (0, l, 0, 0). The probability of an observation under a joint distribution 
is the dot product of the OV with the JDV. 
Note that the dimensionality of an observation is the same as that of a joint 
distribution. Hence observation vectors and JDVs can be embedded in the 
same vector space. 
A set of observations resulting from experiments corresponds to a set of 
OVs that span a vector space called the observation space. This space will 
often be lower dimensional than the space spanned by JDVs. For example, 
consider the evidence from statements 1 and 2 of the poker example; the 
observations correspond to these four vectors: 
Proposition Vector 
A (1, 1, O, O) 
Not A (0, O, l, 1) 
B (1,0, 1,0) 
Not B (0, 1, O, 1) 
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These vectors span a three-dimensional space. The vector (1, - 1, - 1, 1) is 
perpendicular to all four vectors. Hence adding a multiple of (1, - 1, - 1, 1) 
to a JDV will not change the probability of these observations. For example, 
under the JDVs (0.25,0.25, 0.25, 0.25) and (0.5, 0, 0, 0.5), the probabilities 
of the four observations are the same, 
The space spanned by the JDVs is the cross product of the observa- 
tion space and the space spanned by vectors perpendicular to the observation 
space. We call the space spanned by vectors perpendicular to the observa- 
tion space the null  space. Adding a vector from the null space to a JDV 
leaves the probability of the observations unchanged. 
Note that if the difference of two JDVs for a set of experiments i  an element 
of the null space, then the probability of each observation is the same for both 
JDVs. Since the probability of all the observations i the product of the 
probabilities of each observation, the probability of the results from the set 
of experiments is the same for both JDVs. Hence, the results from 
those experiments cannot ell us which of the corresponding joint distributions 
is a better model. For example, no set of unconditional experiments on 
statements A or B can tell us whether (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0,25) or (0.5, 0, 0, 
0.5) is a better estimate of the true joint distribution. 
6. CONCAVITY AND UNIQUENESS OF THE MAXIMA 
Two different joint distributions maximize the likelihood of a set of experi- 
ments only if their JDVs differ by an element of the null space for that set of 
experiments. Hence if we can find a single maximum likelihood joint distribu- 
tion we know what all of them look like. 
First, I show that the likelihood function, L, is concave. Assume that Jl and 
J2 are two JDVs; let f ( -y )= log{L[ j  I + "Y(J2-J l)]}; L(x )= l-lisi(x), 
where s i are sums of elements of the joint distribution. Each si is the 
dot product of an observation vector and a JDV; hence L = H i o i • [Jl + 
v( J2  -- J l)]" 
f ( " / )  = Z log{o i  ° [ J l  "4- ~( J2  -- J l ) ]}  
i 
d2f ( 'y )  [o,  " ( j2 - j , ) ]  2 
d,y2 = - Z , {o , . [ j ,  
Since the second derivative of f is the arithmetic inverse of a sum of squares, 
it is never positive; hence f is concave. Since Jl and J2 are arbitrary JDVs, L 
must be concave. 
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Now assume that Jl and J2 are maximizers of L. Since the log likelihood 
function is concave, all j~ + 3'(J2 - J l )  with 0 < 3' < 1 also maximize the 
joint likelihood function. Hence, the second erivative of f is 0 for 0 < 3' < 1 
because f( ' r)  = log{L[j l  + Y(J2 - J , ) ]}  is a constant function. 
O= = [° ' ' ( J2 - J ' ) ]2  
2 i {O i ' [ j  , +3,(j2--j,)]} 2 
Clearly V i oi ° (J2- J J )=  0; hence J2 -  Jl is in the null space of our 
observations because it is perpendicular to all of our observation vectors. If j~ 
is a maximum likelihood JDV (MLJ) then J2 is an MLJ if and only if Jl - 
J2 is in the null space. 
If we know that the JDV J is an MLJ for a set of experiments with 
observation vectors {o I, 02 . . . . .  Om} and that {O l, 02 . . . . .  O~sm} is a 
minimal subset hat spans the observation space, then the JDV K is an MLJ 
only if Vi~ l O i • J = 0 i • K.  Hence the set of MLJs can be computed by 
applying a set of linear constraints to the set of JDVs. 
An important feature of our system is that introducing a new observable O 
with experiments in which O was true p of the time causes our system to 
assign a probability of p to O; this is in accordance with intuition. This 
feature derives from the fact that the B(n, m) distribution is maximized at 
(n + 1)/(m + 1). 
7. COMPUTATIONAL METHODS 
To discover a vector of positive numbers whose components sum to 1 that 
maximizes the likelihood function is a problem in nonlinear programming. 
Constraining the vector to be a probability distribution limits the search space 
to a convex bounded set (in the form of a hypertetrahedron). Thus we suggest 
applying the method of feasible directions of Topkis and Veinott [31]; this 
algorithm probably converges to a maximum of the polynomials I propose 
here. 
Given a maximum likelihood joint distribution, the method of feasible 
directions can also discover the bounds for any proposition. If experiments 
have been performed testing a proposition, i.e., proposition A in our poker 
example, its probability is the same in all likelihood-maximizing distributions. 
If no experiments have been done on a proposition, such as (Not A and Not 
B) in the poker example, upper and lower bounds for its probability in 
likelihood-maximizing joint distributions can be determined by the method of 
feasible directions. 
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Given a fixed set of variables, the computational cost of evaluating the 
likelihood function is proportional to the number of propositions whose 
probabilities are bounded and on which experiments have been performed. 
Since adding experimental evidence makes the maxima of the likelihood 
function more pronounced (the absolute values of the second derivatives are 
never decreased), the computational cost of finding the maximum depends 
largely on the cost of evaluating the likelihood function. Hence entering and 
retrieving information is linear or better in the amount of information entered. 
8. PROPOSITIONAL AXIOMS 
Our methods of incorporating propositional axioms and probabilistic state- 
ments into our system are essentially identical to Nilsson's approach [26]. 
Statements of propositional logic, like B ~ A, can be added to this system. 
They just fix the probability of certain elements of the joint distribution at 0. In 
particular, the value of every variable that corresponds to an element of the 
truth table that is false under the proposition is set to 0. Such statements reduce 
the size of the JDV (since probabilities that are known to be 0 need not be 
represented) and thus speed computation of the average MLJ. 
If we added B --, A to our poker example, then the probability of c would 
be known to be 0, and the likelihood function would be al°b(a + b)ad 21 
(b + d) as. If we added B ~ A, then the probability of b and c would be set 
to 0; the likelihood function would be 0 because we have experimental evi- 
dence from statement 3 that b has a positive probability. If experimental 
evidence directly contradicts an axiom as above, either the evidence or the 
axiom must be discarded. 
In our system, the probability of a proposition can be limited to a specified 
range. This is a linear constraint on the values of the JDVs. Since the space of 
legitimate JDVs is the intersection of linear constraints, the method of feasible 
directions still applies. Thus we can insert ir~to our system experimental 
evidence, axiomatic knowledge, and probability intervals. 
9. CHOOSING A JDV 
Section 6 characterizes the set of JDVs that maximize the likelihood of the 
observed evidence and characterizes the set of MLJs as a function of an 
arbitrary MLJ. Section 7 discusses a computationally efficient method for 
finding the first MLJ. Once the set of MLJs is known, techniques from Section 
7 can find the maximum and minimum probabilities that an MLJ assigns to a 
proposition (conditional or unconditional). However, a system that returns 
probability intervals uffers a few drawbacks. 
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• Many decisions are ambiguous. Since the probability is an interval, the 
expected cost of a decision becomes an interval; if the expected cost 
intervals of two decisions overlap, it is difficult to choose between the two 
(minimax theories [30] may be appropriate here). 
• The system is complex. Adding new information to our system changes 
both the probabilities in the system and the interval sizes; analyzing 
the result of both effects simultaneously complicates evaluation of our 
analysis. 
It would be much simpler to find an MLJ that is best according to some 
metric and use the probabilities derived from that MLJ as the answer supplied 
by our system. If we assume that all MLJs are equally appropriate a priori, 
then a natural candidate for this "optimal" MLJ is the average of the set of 
MLJs (AMLJ), the center of gravity of the set of MLJs; hence integrating any 
unconditional proposition over the set of MLJs to determine its probability is 
equivalent to using the AMLJ. 
Finding the AMLJ is the problem of finding the center of gravity of a 
high-dimensional convex polytope. We can define such a polytope by the set of 
vectors x that fit the equations Ax = b and Cx >_ d. A encodes the fact that 
MLJs must differ from the one found by the method of feasible directions by 
an element of the null space and any equality constraints on the probability of 
propositions. C encodes the fact that probabilities are greater than or equal to 0 
and sum to 1, and any inequality constraints (such as interval probabilities) on 
propositions. 
Gerber [32] suggests an algorithm for finding the moments of a simplex cut 
off by a half-plane that, when applied for each experimental constraint, can 
compute the AMLJ. This algorithm is polynomial in the size of the JDV and 
the number of different ypes of experiments performed. 
10. SIMPLE EXAMPLE 
I will use the poker example, reprise here. Consider these two propositions: 
A: Harry lit his pipe. 
B: Harry has two pairs. 
Some experiments about the relationship between these two events are: 
1. In the first 30 hands Harry lit his pipe in 9 of them. 
2. In the next 40 hands Harry had two pairs in 5 of them. 
3. In the following hands you noticed that of the 6 times he lit his pipe, 5 of 
those times he had two pairs. 
In our poker example, (0.0625, 0.2375, 0.0625, 0.6375) is the AMLJ for 
statements 1 and 2; we have discovered, using numerical techniques, that the 
MLJ for statements 1, 2, and 3 is approximately (0.174, 0.066, 0, 0.76). 
Since the null space for 1, 2, and 3 is itself null, this is the only MLJ. Table 1 
contains the minimum, average, and maximum probabilities for these events 
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1 and 2 
Event Min : AMLJ : Max 1, 2, and 3 
A 0.2 :0.3 :0.3 0.24 
B 0.125:0.125:0.125 0.174 
A and B 0:0.0625:0.125 0.174 
B given A 0 : 0.208 : 0.417 0.725 
B given Not A 0:0.089 : 0.179 0 
A given B 0:0.5 : 1 1 
A given Not B 0.2 : 0.271:0.343 0.080 
given the JDVs above. Table 1 demonstrates several facts about our poker 
example. 
In the case where only observations 1 and 2 have been made: 
• The probabilities for statement A and statement B are appropriate given 
the evidence. 
• Any level of correlation between A and B is possible. 
• B being false substantially constrains A. 
• Harry's lighting his pipe tells you very little about his hand. 
In the case where observations 1, 2, and 3 have been made: 
• Since A and B are connected by statement 3, their probabilities are 
brought closer together. 
• B - - *A .  
• If Harry is lighting his pipe, definitely bet on his having two pairs. 
• If Harry isn't lighting his pipe, then bet your fortune he doesn't have two 
pairs (this is one of the difficulties with this approach). 
Our poker example demonstrates how our system balances general knowledge 
about the frequency of an event with inferential knowledge about an event. 
To further examine this case, consider what happens if we observe another 
200 hands in which Harry never has two pairs (statement 4). The JDV for this 
case is (0.0396257, 0.130458, 0, 0.829916). Table 2 updates Table 1 to 
include this assertion. Statement 4 has reduced the probability of B consider- 
ably even in the case where A is true. Harry's lighting his pipe is still a very 
good clue that he may have two pairs. 
11. EXPERIMENTS 
To validate our system we concocted a simple joint distribution and ran- 
domly sampled it, simulating typical experimental data. We then used our 




Minimum, Average, and Maximum Probabilities 
for Events in the Poker Example 
1 and 2 
Event Min : AMLJ : Max 1, 2, and 3 1-4 
A 0.3 :0.3 :0.3 0.240 0.170 
B 0.125:0.125:0.125 0.174 0.040 
A and B 0 : 0.0625:0.125 0.174 0.040 
B given A 0 : 0.208 : 0.417 0.725 0.233 
B given Not A 0:0.089 : 0.179 0 0 
A given B 0:0.5 : 1 1 1 
A givenNot B 0.2 :0.271:0.343 0.080 0.136 
and measured how accurate these probabilities and intervals were. Because we 
know the joint distribution (we made it up), we know the true probabilities of 
these events and can compare them to our system's estimated probabilities. 
The joint distribution we constructed had three binary primitive vari- 
ables-American (A),  Red (R), and Corroded Engine (C)- -as in our second 
example. The joint distribution we supplied is shown in Table 3. This joint 
distribution yields probabilities that the engine corrodes in various types of 
cars; we will collect random samples from this distribution and determine from 
our system's probability intervals and estimates that the engine corrodes for 
four types of cars. The results from these investigations will demon- 
strate the power of our system for estimating conditional probabilities from 
experimental data. 
We performed these experiments on data randomly sampled with replace- 
ment from this joint distribution. We checked 
(Sl)  20 samples for property A 
($2) 20 samples for property R 
($3) Five samples for property C 
($4) The next six samples with property A for property C 
($5) The next three samples with property R for property C 
($6) The next two samples without property A for property C 
We performed this set of experiments four times to get the results in Table 4. 
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Truth Values 
American Red Corroded Probability 
T T T 0.10 
T T F 0.05 
T F T 0.10 
T F F 0.25 
F T T 0.05 
F T F 0.10 
F F T 0.05 
F F F 0.30 
Initially our system is not very accurate, but as our sample sizes improve 
(though they never grow large) the system improves in accuracy. Table 5 
shows how the AMLJs grow more accurate as the evidence from E2, E3, and 
E4 is successively added to the E1 evidence. Table 6 show the triplet derived 
from our increasing body of evidence for the probability that various types of 
cars have corroded engines. Table 7 summarizes the accuracy of this method. 
Table 7 shows that our system is not monotonic but does converge on the 
correct answer. When all the evidence is taken together, every interval fits 
about the correct answer. 
12. COMPARISON WITH SIMPLIFIED KYBURG-LOUI  APPROACH 
Here I compare our experimental results with an alternative system that 
I call the simplified Kyburg-Loui approach. It is a simplified version of 
what Kyburg and Loui have proposed for handling conflicting rules of evi- 
dence [2, 4]. The essence of this approach is that to compute the con- 
ditional probability of event E given conditions Ct, C 2 . . . . .  we find the best 
Table 4. Experimental Results 
Experiment 
Set Number S1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 
El 7 5 1 2 2 1 
E2 9 8 2 2 1 1 
E3 11 7 2 2 2 0 
E4 7 6 1 3 1 0 
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Table 5. Estimated AMLJs 
Truth Values a 




E1 + E2 E l -E3  E l -E4  
T T T 
T T F 
T F T 
T F F 
F T T 
F T F 
F F T 
F F F 
0.10 0.058 0.053 0.084 0.085 
0.05 0.042 0.081 0.074 0.081 
0.10 0.047 0.073 0.066 0.074 
0.25 0.203 0.194 0.226 0.185 
0.05 0.108 0.110 0.101 0.077 
0.10 0.042 0.081 0.074 0.081 
0.05 0.098 0.130 0.082 0.065 
0.30 0.402 0.278 0.293 0.351 
aA, American; R, Red; C, corroded. 
Table 6. Probability Intervals and Estimates 
True El  E + E2 
Event Prob. MIN :AMLJ :MAX MIN :AMLJ :MAX 
Cgiven A & R 0.667 0.411 :0.583 :1 0.246 :0,394 :1 
C given A &Not R 0.286 0.162:0.189 :0.227 0.209:0.272 :0.391 
CgivenNot A & R 0.333 0.565 :0.722 :1 0.403 :0.574 :1 
CgivenNot A & Not R 0.143 0.180:0.195 :0.213 0.265 :0.318 :0.397 
E1 +E2+E3 E1 +E2+E3 +E4 
True 
Event Prob. MIN :AMLJ :MAX MIN :AMLJ :MAX 
Cgiven A & R 0.667 0.363 :0.532 :1 0.344 :0.512 :1 
Cgiven A & Not R 0.286 0.180 :0.225 :0.302 0.217 :0.285 :0.416 
CgivenNot A & R 0.333 0.405 :0.576 :1 0.322 :0.487 :1 
CgivenNot A &Not R 0.143 0.184:0.219 :0.274 0.131 :0.157 :0.195 
Table 7. Accuracy of Intervals and Average Probabilities 
E1 E1 + E2 E l -E3  E l -E4  
Event Int a Error Int Error Int Error Int Error 
Cgiven A & R Y 0.084 Y 0.272 Y 0.135 Y 0.154 
Cgiven A & Not R N 0.097 Y 0.013 Y 0.060 Y 0.001 
CgivenNot A & R N -0.389 N -0.241 N -0.243 Y -0.154 
CgivenNot A &Not R N -0.052 N -0.175 N -0.077 Y -0.014 
a y if the true probability lies between the maximum and minimum probabilities computed from 
MLJs. 
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Table 8. The Experiment That Yields Probabilities in the 




C given A & R 
C given Not A & R 
C given A & Not R 
C given Not A & Not R 
C given A 
C given R 
C given A 
C given Not A 
compatible conditional probability that we can compute from our evidence, and 
we use that one. 
The rules to find the best compatible conditional probability are as follows: 
1. Conditional probability S 1 is compatible with S 2 if the conditions on S I 
are a subset of the conditions on $2; A, A I B, A I C, A I B^ C are 
compatible with A I B ^ C. 
2. Statement S~ is better than S 2 if the conditions on S~ are a superset of 
the conditions on $2; A I B ^ C is better than A I B. 
3. If the previous statement does not apply, then S~ is better than S 2 if 
more experiments were done on S~ than on S 2. 
Kyburg and Loui choose a confidence interval from the best statement or 
statements, but our system avoids choosing a confidence interval by computing 
the conditional probability of the event from the experimental evidence. If in n 
trials of ctl0, m came out true, then the probability assigned to ctl0 is 
(m + 1)/(n + 2). This probability is the mean value of the fl distribution 
derived from assuming a uniform prior for the probability of o~ 10. 
Table 8 shows which of the experiments hat we performed is the best for 
each of the conditional probabilities that we are testing. Table 9 compares the 
probabilities we compute from our system (ML) and those of the Kyburg-Loui 
(KL) system, as we accumulate evidence from our four experimental test sets. 
Table 10 compares the errors from the two systems as the total evidence 
increases. Clearly our system converges faster to a better answer than the 
simplified Kyburg-Loui system. 
13. INADEQUACIES AND IMPROVEMENTS 
There are three major difficulties with our system (I do not further consider 
the simplified Kyburg-Loui approach in this paper): 
1. It sometimes behaves in an unintuitive fashion. 
2. When convenient, it assigns the probability of 0 to events. 
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The initial problem will occur in any objective system because there are 
cases where the correct decision is an unintuitive one. Such probability 
paradoxes abound and can be very subtle. Thus human judgment of intuitive 
systems is not useful for evaluating normative probability systems. A better 
judgment of its effectiveness is to evaluate the effectiveness of expert systems 
built using this system. 
The application of the maximum likelihood principle leads to the second 
problem. Assuming certain events are impossible often maximizes the likeli- 
hood of a set of observations (if the impossible event is not observed). This 
leads to the system making overly strong statements such as "Harry never has 
two pairs when his pipe is unlit." Such a strong belief implies that the system 
is willing to bet any sum that Harry doesn't have two pairs when his pipe is 
unlit; this is clearly an unwise strategy. 
The maximum likelihood principle also yields the last problem. If one wants 
to add into our system new information, then using Bayesian updating will not 
generate the probabilities that adding the information directly into the system 
and updating its constraints or polynomial would. 
The last two problems can be eliminated by discarding the maximum 
likelihood principle and, instead, using the likelihood function and Bayes' law 
to translate a prior probability distribution over JDVs into a posterior distribu- 
tion of JDVs. Then the probability of any event or combination of events is 
computed by integrating over the posterior distribution of JDVs. This integra- 
tion can be speeded by the fact that most probable JDVs in this distribution will 
lie near an MLJ. 
I am investigating deriving the distribution over joint marginal distributions 
with Occam's razor: the probability of a JDV would be a function of its 
simplicity. Solomonoff [33] has developed methods for evaluating the simplic- 
ity of distributions and assigning probabilities based on this evaluation. 
Computational cost forbids the direct application of this work to large 
systems with many variables because the JDVs grow exponentially with 
the number of random variables. Independence assumptions can break up such 
systems into several smaller systems that can be handled by this approach. 
Methods for approximate solutions of very large systems of inequalities may be 
applicable to our system. I expect hat systems with up to 20 variables are 
presently computationally feasible. 
14. CONCLUSION 
I have proposed a computational method for propositional evidence combina- 
tion given logical axioms, point probabilities, probability intervals, and experi- 
mental evidence. My system returns probability intervals that are often point 
probabilities; it follows a strictly Bayesian interpretation of the evidence 
522 David B.Sher 
subject o the maximum likelihood principle. In domains where the evidence is 
largely objective, such as medical diagnosis or computer vision, such a system 
may be superior to those based on Dempster-Shafer reasoning or probability 
networks. 
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